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The Efficiency Question in EconomicsRobert Northcott*y
Much philosophical attention has been devoted to whether economic models explain and
more generally to how scientific models represent. Yet there is an issue more practically
important to economics than either of these, which I label the efficiency question: regard-
less of how exactly models represent, or of whether their role is explanatory or something
else, is current modeling practice an efficient way to achieve these goals or should re-
search efforts be redirected? In addition to showing how the efficiency question has been
relatively neglected, I give two examples of the kind of analysis it requires.q11. Introduction: The Efficiency Question. Economic modeling has been
criticized for being too idealized, being intellectually isolated from neigh-
boring fields, and having a poor predictive record.1 A particular debate has
arisenmore recently overwhether economicmodels explain and, if so, inwhat
sense. In this article, I urge a shift in philosophical focus. The reason is that a
different issue is much more pressing. Both sides agree that models are some-
times useful and sometimes not. What really matters is, how often are they
useful? Thus, should economists domore suchmodeling or should they invest
their efforts elsewhere? What matters is not whether models can play the ex-
planatory role that one side insists they can and the other insists they cannot.
Rather, if defenders are right, what matters is howwell, in fact, models do play*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College,
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom; e-mail: r.northcott@bbk.ac.uk.
yI thank Anna Alexandrova and two anonymous referees for useful feedback. I also thank
Richard Urwin, my fellow PSA symposiasts Lawrence Boland, Jennifer Jhun, and James
Weatherall, as well as the symposium audience.
1. Throughout, I will have in mind the orthodox neoclassical models that dominate
mainstream economic theory, i.e., formal models that deduce the equilibrium outcomes
of interactions between economically rational agents. But although there is no space to
pursue it here, much of what I say will apply also to models from other approaches, such
as agent-based simulations, econophysics, network analysis, behavioral economics, and
even Marxist or Austrian economics. It will also apply to models in some other fields
too, such as mathematical ecology.
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2 ROBERT NORTHCOTTtheir explanatory role. And likewise, if critics are right, what matters is how
well models play an alternative role.
I label this the efficiency question. To answer it requires, so to speak, an
epistemic cost-benefit analysis. The costs are the resources invested into
modeling, such as mathematical training of students, and perhaps more no-
tably the opportunity costs, such as fieldwork methods not taught and field-
work not done. The benefits are the successful explanations, predictions, and
interventions that modeling leads to. What is the balance—compared to al-
ternatives?
And what are those alternatives? The answer is any mix of methods other
than the current one and, in particular, mixes that put less emphasis on ortho-
dox theory. Freed of orthodoxmethodological constraints, economics would
arguably be able to take advantage of a much wider range of empirical meth-
ods—generating results that in a virtuous circle could then feed back into
more theory development, just as they do in many other sciences. These
empirical methods include qualitative methods such as interviews and eth-
nographic observation; questionnaires; small-N causal inference, such as
qualitative comparative analysis; purely predictive models; causal process
tracing; causal inference from observational statistics; machine learning from
big data; historical studies; randomized controlled trials; laboratory experi-
ments; and natural and quasi experiments.2 Each of these has its own strengths
and weaknesses, but each is alreadywidely practiced and has a developed and
rigorousmethodological literature. Turning to them is in noway a return to the
fuzzy verbal analysis that is the pejorative memory of much prewar econom-
ics.
What is the optimal balance between, on one hand, building up a library
of orthodox rational choice models and, on the other hand, pursuing more
applied, contextual work and utilizing a wider range of empirical methods?
Current practice is already a mixture of the two, so the question becomes, is
it the right mixture? Of course, the associated cost-benefit analysis can be
done only imperfectly and approximately. In reality, it is hard to count up
explanations and predictions in an objective way, hard to weigh these versus
other goals of science, and hard also to evaluate the counterfactual of whether
a different allocation of resources would have done better. But implicitly, ef-
ficiency analyses are unavoidable and are being done already, namely, every
time a researcher chooses, or a graduate school teaches, one method rather
than another or journals or prizes or hirers choose one paper or candidate rather
than another.3 The status quo is not inevitable, as shown by different practices2. The latter few of these have begun to be co-opted by mainstream economics already.
3. Of course, other factors enter such decisions too, such as what best serves one’s own
career. Nevertheless, an implicit efficiency analysis is certainly one important compo-
nent.
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THE EFFICIENCY QUESTION IN ECONOMICS 3in other social sciences and also within economics by the recent ‘empirical
turn’ (sec. 5 below). So the efficiency question must be faced. And it is surely
better to face it explicitly than to leave it to inertia and sociological winds. Ef-
ficiency analysis is worth our time. Indeed, it is arguably the most practically
important issue in philosophy of economics.
It might be objected that such efficiency analysis is impossible because
orthodox theory and the various alternatives are too entangled to be separated.
For example, the very hypothesis a field trial tests might be derived from the-
ory.4 This is true up to a point, but not up to the point that the possibility of
efficiency analysis can be wished away. This is again best demonstrated by
examples, which will illustrate both the feasibility and the value of efficiency
analysis.
What is the best way to do efficiency analysis? In practice, it is via case
studies, that is, the details of actual examples, rather than via than some ab-
stract calculus.Moreover, its answers are typically not especially sensitive to
the exact philosophical account of explanation that we happen to endorse.
For this very reason, at least for the purpose of efficiency analysis in eco-
nomics, philosophical attention should be diverted away from theories of ex-
planation. These claims are again best demonstrated by example, to which
I turn in a moment.
Two kinds of efficiency analysis are possible. The first is global: does the
current overall allocation of resources serve economics well compared to a
different allocation? This is the most challenging to assess because of the
vast range of costs and benefits involved. The second kind of efficiency anal-
ysis is local: given a particular explanandum, what methods should be used
to tackle it and in what proportion? This is much more tractable, and many
case studies are in part just such analyses already.
The plan of the article is as follows: in the next section, I present an ex-
ample of efficiency analysis at the local level. Then I explain how the effi-
ciency question has been neglected by the philosophy of economics litera-
ture, before showing how it has been neglected by the wider scientific
modeling literature too. At the end, I return to the issue of efficiency analysis
at the global level.
2. Local Efficiency Analysis: Prisoner’s Dilemma and World War I
Truces. According to JSTOR, almost 22,000 journal articles have appeared4. It is a truism that all empirical work assumes some ‘theory’ in the form of background
assumptions. But the issue here is whether these background assumptions must include
those of orthodox economic theory. This also makes clear why the efficiency question is
distinct from the separate debate, within philosophy of economics, about the relative mer-
its of targeted vs. targetless models, for both of these model types share the same com-
mitment to orthodox fundamentals.
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4 ROBERT NORTHCOTTabout the Prisoner’s Dilemma since 1970. A striking aspect of this huge liter-
ature is its overwhelmingly theoretical focus. Much of it concerns develop-
ments of the basic game: versions with multiple moves or players, versions
with asynchronous moves, iterated versions, evolutionary versions, andmany
other tweaks besides. Research muscle has been bet on theoretical develop-
ment. Empirical applications, by contrast, are conspicuously thin on the
ground.5
It is in fact hard to find serious attempts to apply the Prisoner’s Dilemma
to explain actual historical or contemporary phenomena, as opposed to infor-
mal mentions or offhand remarks. I will focus here on one of the few such
attempts, namely, the well-known analysis by Axelrod (1984) of the live-
and-let-live system of spontaneous truces inWorldWar I.6 Has the Prisoner’s
Dilemma literature’s theoretical focus borne fruit in this case? I answer ‘no’
and thus that there is good reason to think that—with respect to this partic-
ular explanandum—research muscle has been allocated inefficiently.7
Axelrod models the situation in the WWI trenches as an iterated Prison-
er’s Dilemma. What behaviors should we expect? To answer that, Axelrod
ran a series of computer tournaments fromwhich he inferred that the optimal
strategy is tit-for-tat with initial cooperation; that is, we should expect players
initially to cooperate and thereafter to repeat whatever the other player did in
the previous period.8 Axelrod then draws on the fascinating and detailed ac-
count of WWI trench warfare by the historian Tony Ashworth (1980), itself
based on extensive archives, letters, and interviews with veterans. Axelrod’s
explicit goal (1984, 71) is to explain how informal truces could have arisen
spontaneously on the Western front despite constant pressure against them
from senior commanders. His case is that, upon analysis, the implicit payoffs
for each side were those of an indefinitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and
that cooperation—that is, a truce—is therefore exactly his theory’s prediction.
Many historical details seem to support Axelrod’s case, such as the lim-
ited retaliations that followed breaches of a truce or the demonstrations of
force capability via harmless means in order to establish a threat credibly
but nondisruptively. Perhaps the most striking evidence is how the live-5. A lot of the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature is ‘empirical’ in the sense that it reports on
psychological experiments, but that does not negate the main point here.
6. See Northcott and Alexandrova (2015) for more details and references about all as-
pects of this case.
7. There is also good reason to think that the WWI case is typical in this respect of ap-
plications of Prisoner’s Dilemma more generally, although that is beside the point for a
local efficiency analysis.
8. Analytically, there are many optimal strategies. One of Axelrod’s innovations was to
use simulations to narrow these down. It has subsequently been disputed whether Ax-
elrod was right that tit-for-tat is indeed the optimal strategy, but the text’s main points
hold anyway.
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THE EFFICIENCY QUESTION IN ECONOMICS 5and-let-live system eventually broke down. The (unwitting) cause of this
was a policy, dictated by senior command, of frequent raids, that is, carefully
prepared attacks on enemy trenches. If successful, prisoners would be taken;
if not, casualties would be proof of the attempt. Since raids and retaliations
could be easily monitored by senior officers, covert cooperation between the
two sides became impossible. It is no coincidence, Axelrod argues, that ex-
actly then the truces broke down.
Is this a case, then, of theoretical work earning its explanatory keep and
thus of research resources being allocated wisely? That is certainly how it is
usually reported, including by Axelrod. But, alas, closer inspection shows
the opposite. To begin, by Axelrod’s own admission some elements of the
story deviate from his predictions. The norms of most truces, for instance,
were not tit-for-tat but more like three-tits-for-tat; that is, typically retaliation
for the breach of a truce was roughly three times stronger than the original
breach. More seriously, a vital element to sustaining the truces was the de-
velopment of what Axelrod terms ethics and rituals: local truce norms be-
came ritualized and their observance quickly acquired a moral tinge in the
eyes of soldiers. This made truces much more robust and is crucial to ex-
plaining their persistence, as Axelrod concedes. Yet, as Axelrod also con-
cedes, Prisoner’s Dilemma says nothing about it. Indeed, he comments that
this emergence of ethics is modeled most easily as a change in the players’
payoffs, that is, as a different game altogether (1984, 85).
There are several other important shortfalls in addition to those remarked
by Axelrod. First, his theory predicts there should be no truce breaches at all,
but in fact breaches were common. Second, as a result (and as Axelrod does
acknowledge), a series of dampening mechanisms therefore had to be devel-
oped in order to defuse postbreach cycles of retaliation. Again, the tit-for-tat
analysis is silent about this vital element. Third, it is not just that truces had
to be robust against continuous minor breaches; the bigger story is that often
no truces arose at all. Indeed, Ashworth examined regimental and other ar-
chives in some detail to arrive at the estimate that, overall, there were truces
only about one-quarter of the time (1980, 171–75). That is, on average,
three-quarters of the front was not in a condition of live-and-let-live. Prison-
er’s Dilemma is silent as to why. Finally, Axelrod’s explanations are after the
fact; there are no novel predictions. Thus, it is difficult to rule out wishful
rationalization or that other games might fit the evidence just as well.
There is no mystery, meanwhile, as to what the actual explanations of
these various phenomena are, for they are given clearly by Ashworth and in-
deed inmany cases are explicit in the letters of the original soldiers. Thus, for
instance, elite and nonelite units had different attitudes and incentives, for
various well-understood reasons. These in turn led to truces occurring over-
whelmingly only between nonelite units, again for well-understood reasons.
Why did breaches of truces occur frequently, even before raiding became14049.proof.3d 5 09/12/18 01:50Achorn International
6 ROBERT NORTHCOTTwidespread? Ashworth explains via detailed reference to different incentives
for different units (artillery vs. frontline infantry, for instance) and to the fal-
libility of the mechanisms in place for controlling individual hotheads (1980,
153–71). And so on. Removing our Prisoner’s Dilemma lens, we see that we
have perfectly adequate explanations already.
Overall, we cannot reasonably claim that Axelrod’s theoretical analysis
explains the WWI truces. It is not empirically adequate, it misses crucial el-
ements even in those areas where at face value it is empirically adequate, and
it is silent on obvious related explananda: not just why truces persisted but
also why they arose on only a minority of occasions, how they originated, and
(to some degree) when and why they broke down. Meanwhile, we already
have an alternative that does explain all of these things—namely, Ashworth’s
historical account.
This comparative verdict holds true given any plausible theory of expla-
nation or of prediction’s relation to explanation. We have no empirical war-
rant for thinking that Prisoner’s Dilemma identified the relevant causes, thus
negating claims of causal explanation. Deductive-nomological, unification,
and mathematical accounts of scientific explanation similarly require an em-
pirical warrant that is absent in this case. Some recent accounts of explanation
by models, as we will see below, do put less emphasis on empirical warrant.
But what matters here is the relative explanatory achievement of Ashworth
and Axelrod, and given the disparity in empirical success, no plausible ac-
count of explanation would prefer Axelrod.
But even if it fails to explain, perhaps Prisoner’s Dilemma instead can
earn its keep here heuristically? Alas, not so. The first reason is that it does
not lead us to any explanations that we did not have already. Ubiquitous quo-
tations in Ashworth show that soldiers were very well aware of the basic
strategic logic of reciprocity and of the importance of a credible threat for
deterring breaches (1980, 150). They were well aware too of why frequent
raiding rendered truces impossible to sustain, an outcome indeed that many
ruefully anticipated even before the policy was implemented (191–98). In
other words, Prisoner’s Dilemma is following here, not leading.
The second reason Prisoner’s Dilemma lacks heuristic value is that it ac-
tively diverts attention away from the aspects that were actually important.
I have in mind the crucial features mentioned above: how truces originated,
the causes and management of the many small breaches of them, the impor-
tance of ethics and ritualization to their maintenance, why truces occurred only
in some sections of the front rather than in a majority of them, and so on.
Again, these basic conclusions about the case are robust against differ-
ences within the philosophical literature over precisely how best to analyze
heuristic or other nonexplanatory virtues, such as understanding.
A common fallback defense here is that at least Prisoner’s Dilemma offers
the virtue of systematization over mere singular explanation, as befits social14049.proof.3d 6 09/12/18 01:50Achorn International
THE EFFICIENCY QUESTION IN ECONOMICS 7science as opposed to history. Thus, it is claimed, Prisoner’s Dilemma sheds
light on cooperation in general, not just in the specific setting of WWI trench
warfare. As it were, global efficiency analysis still favors it even if this local
one does not. In reply: true enough,models that explain or give heuristic value
over many different cases are indeed highly desirable and would accord-
ingly be endorsed by a global efficiency analysis. But Prisoner’s Dilemma
does neither and meanwhile uses up huge resources along the way. As Julian
Reiss, Robert Sugden, and others have argued, the only way to get a reliable
sense of what theoretical input is actually useful is to do detailed empirical
investigations, so resources would be better directed toward those rather
than toward yet more theoretical development. Empirical success in partic-
ular cases is arguably a necessary condition for usefulness across many
(Northcott, forthcoming b). Correctly understanding what actually encour-
aged cooperation in the WWI case, for instance, is an essential first step if
that case is truly to teach us about cooperation in other cases too. But Pris-
oner’s Dilemma directs our attention to the wrong things.
Local efficiency analyses will inevitably be based on case studies. When
studying a case in detail the efficiency question becomes tractably local and
concrete, and the verdict often becomes correspondingly clear, so that wor-
ries about how exactly to define and weigh up explanations, predictions, and
other virtues become unimportant. In the WWI case, the verdict is that re-
sources put into the theoretical Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis were not well
spent. They would have been better directed to the history department.
3. The Philosophy of Economics Literature. There is a standard view
about how orthodox economic models are, and should be, used. Roughly,
no one imagines that any given model will be applicable to every problem;
instead, economists build up a library of such models, thereby increasing
the repertoire available for any particular application. All such models obey
the same orthodox fundamentals, at least in large part. In this way, advocates
say, any model is guaranteed to be precise, its conclusions to be derived rig-
orously and to be clearly testable, and above all its analysis to be ‘economic’
in the sense of being couched as the result of rational agent choices in the
face of incentives. Within this orthodox framework, many quite different
policy conclusions may be supported; the framework itself merely enforces
rigor of method, not any particular policy stance (Rodrik 2015).
On this view, economic models study the interaction of causal variables
in a shielded environment. In this respect, they follow the Galilean method
standard in natural sciences for centuries. Model application is a judgment of
fit between model and target: we should choose the model that captures the
causes that are actually important in any particular case. A model then offers
causal explanations, since it shows that a particular effect is to be expected
given a particular arrangement of causes. Such models are, of course, ideal-14049.proof.3d 7 09/12/18 01:50Achorn International
8 ROBERT NORTHCOTTized. But their idealizations hurt only when they impede the Galilean project,
that is, when we cannot give the model a causal interpretation and use it to
intervene successfully. Something like this view is endorsed by much influ-
ential work in philosophy of economics, for instance, that of early Cart-
wright (1989) and Mäki (1992). It is also endorsed (sometimes implicitly)
by the majority of economists themselves.
This view of economic modeling continues a long tradition stretching
back to Mill (1843). He argued that the ever-changing mix of causes in un-
controlled field cases makes accurate prediction a naive and infeasible goal.
Instead, theory should state core causal tendencies, such as human agents’
tendency to maximize their wealth. In any particular application, we com-
pose relevant tendencies in a deductive way and then add in as necessary
local ‘disturbing causes’—that is, causal factors not captured by theory but
that are also present. In this way, deductive theory is claimed to be more em-
pirically fruitful than predictive alternatives because it offers generalizabil-
ity; that is, it offers the prospect of empirical success in many applications by
adding in different disturbing causes each time. This justifies prioritizing
modeling orthodoxy over empirical fit—a prioritization that is frequently ap-
parent in economic practice (Reiss 2008, 106–22; Northcott, forthcoming a).
There have been many criticisms of this orthodoxy, addressing, among
other things, idealization, social ontology, and the foundations of rational
choice theory (Elster 1988; Rosenberg 1992; Lawson 1997; Cartwright 1999).
But these criticisms, being general and fundamental in nature, have tended
not to distinguish the orthodoxy’s empirical successes from its failures. They
are not nuanced enough to yield practical advice as to what mix of methods
will serve economics best going forward.
More recently, much criticism has targeted the view, implied by the ortho-
doxy, that economic models explain. The objection is that, on the contrary,
economic models do not explain (Northcott and Alexandrova 2013). It is
charged that they do not satisfy the usual criteria for causal explanation,
in particular, that their idealizations mean that they do not state true causes.
Instead, models are taken to play various other roles. One such alternative
role is that they offer ‘how-possibly’ explanations, that is, derivations that
speak only to possibility in the idealized world of the model (Aydinonat
2008; Grüne-Yanoff 2009; Forber 2010). Another is that models are useful
only heuristically, serving to suggest initial categories or lines of inquiry but
not themselves earning warrant from empirical success. Instead, that warrant
accrues to whatever much more narrow-scope causal hypothesis is eventu-
ally confirmed empirically andwhich is typically not derivable from the gen-
eral model (Alexandrova 2008; Alexandrova andNorthcott 2009; Northcott,
forthcoming b).
In response, it has been argued back that the explanatory claims of models
can be established after all, by means of robustness analysis, that is, by show-14049.proof.3d 8 09/12/18 01:50Achorn International
THE EFFICIENCY QUESTION IN ECONOMICS 9ing that a model’s derivations are robust with respect to variation of some of
its assumptions (Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni 2010). Moreover, if
we understand explanation sufficiently broadly (Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014),
then it may be that models may still explain even if they are best understood
as mere how-possibly explanations or heuristic aids.
But regardless of whether models can indeed explain, that still does not
tell us whether to put resources into more modeling or instead into other
methods. For that, we would need to know in addition how often and effi-
ciently models explain—or how often and efficiently they perform their non-
explanatory role.
Overall, the efficiency question so far has not been a primary focus of phi-
losophy of economics. And moreover, what has been the primary focus,
such as whether models explain, has now reached such an advanced degree
of refinement that it no longer hasmuch new to say about how research effort
in economics should be allocated. The best allocation, as in the WWI exam-
ple, may often be obvious regardless of our precise preferred theory of ex-
planation, in which case further emphasis on the latter will not help with
the efficiency question. That is the reason for urging a refocusing of philo-
sophical attention.
4. The Scientific Modeling Literature. Turn next to the wider scientific
modeling literature. In effect, it too has largely neglected the efficiency
question.
Begin by noting that the modeling literature has been “nearly unanimous
in saying that models have to be representative in order to give us knowl-
edge” (Knuuttila 2005, 1260). Chakravartty (2010, 171) explains why: “a
scientific representation is something that facilitates practices such as inter-
pretation and inference with respect to its target system. . . . How could such
practice be facilitated were it not for some sort of similarity between the
representation and the thing it represents—is it a miracle?” The core idea
is that target systems are objects in the world with a structure that a model’s
structure in some way maps onto. Various accounts have been offered of the
representation relation between model and target, initially including iso-
morphism, partial isomorphism, and similarity (Frigg 2006). (More recently,
accounts have become influential that analyze representation in terms of prac-
tical function or inferential role; see below.)
Across science, many times models clearly are explanatory, and in such
cases a focus on representation is eminently sensible: successfully repre-
senting a cause immediately yields a causal explanation, for instance, and
successful representation explains empirical success too. In nonexplanatory
cases matters are subtler because the model itself does not explain and it
might not predict successfully either. On the heuristicist view, for instance,
what matters to (causal) explanation is instead whether an eventual causal14049.proof.3d 9 09/12/18 01:50Achorn International
10 ROBERT NORTHCOTThypothesis represents, not whether the initial heuristic model does. Thus,
we need assume nothing about any representation relation between the ini-
tial model and the target.9 That does still leave a link between representation
and explanation, but now in a different place. In the WWI case, for exam-
ple, Ashworth’s historical explanations succeed precisely because they truly
represent actual causes.
But the efficiency question concerns something different: is orthodox
modeling a good way to achieve successful representations? The superior-
ity of Ashworth’s explanations is clear on any plausible view of represen-
tation, just as it was on any plausible view of explanation. Accordingly, at
least in the WWI case, debating the best theory of representation sheds no
light on the efficiency question, any more than debating the best theory of
explanation did. What is required instead is a comparison of how well dif-
ferent methodological approaches achieve successful representations—in
other words, efficiency analysis.
One virtue of the recent modeling literature is that it allows for failures of
representation as well as successes, but again that is different from assessing
which methods best avoid such failures.
Finally, a separate strand of the modeling literature has concerned the re-
lation between models and parent theories. Reacting against the close rela-
tion posited by the semantic view of theories, a rival view has become very
influential in the last couple of decades, namely, that of models as mediators
(Morgan and Morrison 1999). Very roughly, this sees models as being auton-
omous from both general theories and particular phenomena. This autonomy
allows models to act as epistemic tools, facilitating interventions and serv-
ing as instruments of exploration in their own right. One example is the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game, which is distinct both from general economic princi-
ples and from particular examples of strategic cooperation.
There has been some interesting convergence between the mediator and
representation strands of the literature. In particular, as noted above, more
recent accounts of representation often define it in practical terms such as in-
ferential role (Suarez 2015). Knuuttila (2011) emphasizes models’ role in
this regard precisely as epistemic tools. But again, notwithstanding the inter-
est of these accounts for other purposes, what matters for efficiency analysis
is a separate question—namely, which methods produce models that are
good epistemic tools or good mediators.
5. Conclusion: Global Efficiency Analysis and the Empirical Turn. Re-
cently, economics has seen a much remarked ‘empirical turn’. For instance,
in the five most prestigious journals in economics, the percentage of papers9. Grüne-Yanoff (2013), working with a how-possibly interpretation of models, argues
for a similar antirepresentation thesis.
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57% in 1983 to 19% in 2011 (Hamermesh 2013). Moreover, not only is there
more empirical work in prestigious venues but also this empirical work is less
often theory based as opposed to ‘atheoretical’; that is, it tests particular the-
oretical models less often as opposed to establishing previously untheorized
causal relations. Biddle and Hamermesh (2016) report that whereas in the
1970s all microeconomic empirical papers in the top five journals exhibited
a theoretical framework, in the 2000s there was a resurgence of atheoretical
studies. Citation numbers suggest that the atheoretical work is at least as in-
fluential. Angrist and Pischke (2010) also report the rise of atheoretical prac-
tice in several subfields.
One obvious possibility is that the empirical turn has been caused by, in
effect, an accumulation of global efficiency analyses by practitioners, which
have motivated an overall shift in research emphasis from pure theory to-
ward empirical application. There is anecdotal evidence for this conjecture
but as yet no more than that, and we must await more detailed work by his-
torians of economics. But the empirical turn is in any case significant here for
other reasons. Its mere existence shows that theoretical and empirical work
are sufficiently distinct for it to be meaningful to speak of a shift in resources
from one to the other. It also shows that the discipline’s norms and incentives
are not so entrenched as to make such a shift practically impossible. As a re-
sult, it now becomes incumbent on philosophers to evaluate such shifts: is
the empirical turn a good thing? And presumably any such evaluation would
be precisely some form of global efficiency analysis.
Overall, efficiency analyses, both local and global, are inevitable and hap-
pening anyway. As philosophers of economics we should be assessing them
explicitly, as well as carrying out such analyses ourselves. We should not be
restricting our work just to further examination of the epistemic properties
of models; instead, let us widen our view to include also the organization
of the discipline as a whole. In common with economists themselves, I take
the efficiency question to be of greater practical importance to economics
than are the minutiae of explanation or representation. It deserves greater at-
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QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR
Q1.Au: Your article has been edited for grammar, clarity, consistency, and con-
formity to journal style, including issues of hyphenation and capitalization. The
Chicago Manual of Style is followed for matters of style and Webster’s Dictio-
nary for spelling. Please read the article to make sure that your meaning has
been retained. Journal style is to avoid a lot of italics for emphasis. May be used
for terms that are defined. If any italics have been removed that change your
meaning, they will be restored. Note that we may be unable to make revisions
that conflict with journal style or create grammatical problems.
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